What would “peaceful coexistence” between the two Korean states require? The 2026 DPRK Constitutional Amendments. 대한민국과 조선민주주의인민공화국의 평화적 공존의 시대는 무엇을 필요로 하는가?

May 09, 2026

“Violation of the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea, down with U.S. domination. 190th National Mass Candlelight Rally for Sovereignty and Independence, Brunson, leave. Michelle Steel, don’t come. May 8, 2026, Seoul.”

I belong to the post–Korean War generation, born, raised, and educated in Korea under the most thorough anti–North Korea education and doctrine.

Popular TV dramas were about detectives catching North Korean spies. When I was little, I used to have nightmares about North Koreans invading us and robbing my house and my family. I used to think about where the best place to hide would be, and I came up with what I thought was the best idea: climbing up to the top of an apple tree (we lived in a large apple orchard). I was five years old.

The content of education focused on how to defeat the “enemy,” and the themes of speech contests, essay contests, and school military drills were all geared toward cultivating animosity against the North.

Photo: Myself in 5th grade receiving second prize in a speech contest on June 25, “How to Defeat the North Korean Enemy.” © Simone Chun, 2026

Meanwhile, we received repeated reinforcement of narratives that the U.S. is our savior, that General MacArthur saved us, etc.

So when I read the DPRK’s 2026 constitutional revision, I feel I can understand it, at least to some extent. Here are 5 takeaways.

1. The “Republic of Korea” is a separate state constrained by U.S. influence and unable to act independently, with which the DPRK seeks a form of “peaceful coexistence” between the two Korean states.

The essence of the DPRK’s (“North Korea”) 2026 constitutional revision is the redefinition of relationships. The Republic of Korea (“South Korea”) is now positioned just as a neighboring state, the DPRK’s nuclear command authority is formally embedded within the state structure, and overseas Koreans remain recognized as a transnational legal category. The DPRK has rewritten its constitution to remove any reference to reunification with the South. The constitutional shift therefore transforms the relationship from a division within one nation into a regulated border between states.

There is no explicit designation of the South as the “primary hostile state.” By referring to the South as the “Republic of Korea,” the North implicitly recognizes it as a separate state.

Article 2 defines North Korea’s territory as bordering China and Russia to the north and the Republic of Korea to the south. In this framework, South Korea is no longer treated as a region awaiting reunification but as a separate neighboring state located at the southern border. South Korea is now placed within the same structural category as neighboring states, such as China, Russia, and Japan, etc. Under this framework, issues such as the Military Demarcation Line, maritime disputes in the West Sea, drones, loudspeakers, and leaflet campaigns can no longer be framed as internal national matters. Within this constitutional structure, they become matters of interstate security.

2. The removal of “unification” transforms inter-Korean relations.

The new constitution completely removed all references to “unification.”

The North once envisioned a confederal model—often described as a federation—in which the two Koreas, while recognizing their different political systems, would jointly manage foreign affairs and defense through a common governing structure while otherwise operating independently according to their respective systems. In effect, this was a “one nation, two systems” model.

The South, by contrast, has long favored a “two states, two systems” approach, often framed as a loose form of inter-Korean union. In practice, however, the South did not genuinely pursue peaceful unification. The National Security Law, which defines the North as an “anti-state organization,” has remained intact. Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitution, which implicitly regard the North as territory to be absorbed through capitalist expansion, have also remained unchanged. Large-scale military exercises targeting the North—including joint exercises with the United States and, more recently, Japan—have been conducted almost year-round. While peaceful unification remained a rhetorical goal, South Korea’s laws and policies often reflected a different reality.

Even the hopeful and emotionally powerful efforts at inter-Korean rapprochement under the Moon Jae-in administration ultimately collapsed when the South, under U.S. pressure, failed to fulfill agreements made with the North.

Despite major differences, both sides once shared an important premise: mutual recognition of each other’s systems and the pursuit of peaceful unification. On that basis, efforts toward unification continued for more than 80 years. Earlier inter-Korean agreements defined the principles of unification as “independence, peace, and great national unity.” Now, however, the North appears to have abandoned the concept entirely.

Under these conditions, the North removed unification from its constitution. Here, “unification” refers specifically to the earlier vision of peaceful unification based on mutual recognition of differing systems. That vision now appears to have disappeared. The constitutional shift therefore transforms the relationship from a division within one nation into a regulated border between states.

3. Nuclear command and the constitutionalization of deterrence become central to the revised framework.

The DPRK does not merely affirm the possession of nuclear weapons; rather, nuclear command authority legally embeds operational nuclear control within the state structure and the constitutionalization of deterrence.

Another major feature of the revision is the institutional codification of centralized political, military, and nuclear authority. The leadership structure is formally defined as the apex of political, military, and nuclear command.

The inclusion of nuclear command authority is particularly significant because it legally embeds operational nuclear control within the state structure. Earlier constitutional revisions had already codified nuclear policy, but the 2026 revision appears to extend this into a full command architecture.

As a result, denuclearization demands are no longer interpreted simply as technical arms-control proposals. Instead, they are perceived as challenges to the state’s core security structure. Because the constitution defines nuclear capability as central to national defense, demands for denuclearization are viewed not as arms reduction but as calls to dismantle the state’s security architecture itself.

4. Overseas Koreans are defined as a transnational legal category. While formal inter-state relations are being redefined around separation and hostility, overseas Koreans remain constitutionally preserved as a legitimate transnational category.

While state-to-state relations with South Korea are being severed, the broader ethnic concept of the Korean nation has not been entirely abandoned.

The constitutional revision preserves overseas Koreans as a transnational legal category. This is significant because it exists alongside the reclassification of South Korea as a neighboring state. These two structures must therefore be understood together.

Article 12 protects the democratic national rights and international legal rights of overseas Koreans. Here, “overseas Koreans” refers to a broader ethnic category than formal citizenship. Citizens are nationals of North Korea, while overseas Koreans include ethnic Koreans residing abroad regardless of citizenship status. This broader category includes Korean Americans, Zainichi Koreans in Japan, ethnic Koreans in China, and Koryo-saram communities in the former Soviet region. At the same time, legal distinctions between citizenship and ethnic identity remain important.

Nevertheless, the overseas Korean clause is not merely symbolic. It encompasses cultural identity, rights protection, education, , residence, and economic cooperation. It suggests that while state-to-state relations with South Korea are being severed, the broader ethnic concept of the Korean nation has not been entirely abandoned. While formal inter-state relations are being redefined around separation and hostility, overseas Koreans remain constitutionally preserved as a legitimate transnational category. The role of overseas Koreans may therefore become increasingly important as a channel for indirect engagement. Therefore, the role of overseas Koreans may therefore become increasingly important as a channel for indirect engagement.

5. What would “peaceful coexistence” between the two Korean states require?

Continuing to rely on older assumptions—absorption unification, regime-collapse scenarios, or military deterrence as a pathway to political transformation—is structurally incompatible with the constitutional order emerging in the DPRK.

In an era marked by weakening U.S. hegemony and the emergence of a more multipolar international order, overcoming dependency on the United States and dismantling the legal and structural frameworks of division is a minimum condition for “peaceful coexistence” between DPRK and ROK.

To do so, ROK must first discard what has long functioned as ideological dogma: the conception of unification centered on absorption. This would require abolishing the National Security Law and revising Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitution, which define the North as a territory to be recovered. It would also require ending the annual military exercises involving the United States and Japan that simulate war against the DPRK, dismantling the framework of hostility that has long defined policy, ending routine vilification, and pursuing a formal end-of-war declaration. Further, the United States Forces Korea Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which grants extensive privileges to U.S. forces stationed in Korea, must not only be dismantled, but USFK must withdraw from the South completely in due time.

If these steps are taken, it may become possible to build a normal state-to-state relationship, fostering economic and political cooperation.

If, however, the ROK continues on its current trajectory—maintaining annual military drills with U.S. and Japanese participation, treating the DPRK as a target for capitalist absorption, and continuing hostility and condemnation—there will never be any hope for even peaceful coexistence between the two Korean states, let alone Korean unity or unification.

조선민주주의인민공화국(“북한”)의 2026년 헌법 개정의 본질은 관계의 재정의에 있다. 남한을 “제1의 적대국”으로 명시적으로 규정하는 표현은 존재하지 않는다. 그러나 북한은 남한을 “대한민국”이라고 호명함으로써 사실상 별개의 국가로 암묵적으로 인정하고 있다. 미국의 영향 아래 독자적으로 행동하지 못하는 “대한민국”은 조선민주주의인민공화국이 두 개의 한국 국가 간 “평화적 공존”을 모색하는 대상인 별개의 국가로 규정되고 있다. “통일”의 삭제는 남북관계를 근본적으로 변화시키고 있다. 핵지휘권과 억지력의 헌법화는 개정 헌법의 중심 요소로 부상하고 있으며, 해외동포 역시 초국가적 법적 범주로 규정되고 있다.

이러한 변화 속에서 흡수통일, 체제붕괴 시나리오, 혹은 군사적 억지를 통한 정치 변환과 같은 오래된 가정에 계속 의존하는 것은 북한에서 형성되고 있는 새로운 헌법 질서와 구조적으로 양립할 수 없다.

이를 위해 대한민국은 오랫동안 이념적 교리처럼 기능해 온 흡수통일 중심의 통일관을 먼저 폐기해야 한다. 이는 북한을 회복 대상 영토로 규정하는 국가보안법의 폐지와 헌법 제3조·제4조의 개정을 요구한다. 또한 미국과 일본이 참여하는 대북 전쟁연습을 중단하고, 오랫동안 정책을 규정해 온 적대 구조를 해체하며, 일상적인 비난과 적대 담론을 중단하고, 공식적인 종전선언을 추진해야 한다. 더 나아가 주한미군에게 광범위한 특권을 부여하는 한미주둔군지위협정(SOFA)은 해체되어야 하며, 주한미군 역시 적절한 시기에 남한에서 완전히 철수해야 한다.

대한민국이 현재의 정책을 계속 유지하면서 미국·일본과의 연례 군사훈련을 지속하고, 북한을 자본주의적 흡수의 대상으로 간주하며 적대와 비난을 계속한다면, 두 한국 국가 간의 평화적 공존은 물론이고 한국의 통일이나 민족적 연합에 대한 희망 역시 결코 실현될 수 없을 것이다.