What-If Question: WHAT IF the U.S. Fulfilled the Conditions North Korea Has Set?
The tragic reality concerning the Korean Peninsula is that without the U.S. abandoning its hostile policy toward North Korea, nothing can be done.
As long as the United States maintains its hostile policy toward North Korea, South Korea can’t do anything—in fact, not much without Washington’s “approval.” Nor can rising China, which now clearly has global influence; North Korea’s strong ally, Russia, which also has the potential power to influence Trump’s decisions, especially regarding the Ukraine war; or even China-Russia-North Korea cooperation, which opponents of U.S.-North Korea rapprochement cite as the main threat to U.S. geopolitical interests in Northeast Asia.
The Tragic Reality
Case in point: this tragic reality was most clearly demonstrated when Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited South Korea. Foreign Minister Cho Hyun explained the South Korean government’s efforts to achieve denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula and asked China to play a constructive role in encouraging North Korea to return to dialogue as soon as possible. In other words, South Korea was essentially asking China to “build a bridge to inter-Korean dialogue because we are working so hard.” But Wang offered only a general response. Instead, he called on the United States to abandon its hostile policy toward North Korea. What appeared to be China’s standard principle when it comes to foreign policy—that is, respecting sovereignty and non-interference in other states’ relations—also appears to reflect China’s recognition that, as long as the United States maintains its hostile policy toward North Korea, South Korea has little room to act. Wang also reminded South Korea of the importance of pursuing independent and sovereignty-oriented decisions.
You may not like to hear this, but that’s a reality. That’s why.
That’s why many are still interested in what Washington is willing to, can, or must do—in fact, any signs of rapprochement. Today’s posting is one of them. That said, I, for one, cannot forsake or overlook the obvious obstacles and continuing U.S. hostile policies that I have written about so frequently. So, I can only frame this posting by raising a hypothetical question: What if?
The “What If?” Question
In Ulysses, James Joyce writes about the “What if?” question. Stephen, the main protagonist, sees history as something oppressive that one might wish to escape—a “nightmare from which I am trying to awake.”
Stephen asks himself what if history had been different, and what would happen if the nightmare of history struck back: “What if that nightmare gave you a back kick?” Written in the context of Ireland’s subjugation under British rule, Joyce’s words suggest that history is not simply a fixed record of the past but a living force that shapes the present—and that writers and artists have both the imagination and, perhaps, the responsibility to ask the disruptive question: What if? What if history had unfolded differently? What if Ireland had not remained under the shackles of England? By asking such questions, artists can challenge the inevitability of the historical order and open space for imagining a different political future.
For Korea, the same question remains profoundly relevant: What if Korea had not been divided? What if Korea had not lived under decades of foreign military domination? What if Koreans had been allowed to determine their own political and national destiny?
With such a spirit, I raise a “What if?” question for the current Korean Peninsula.
WHAT IF the U.S. Fulfilled the Conditions North Korea Has Set?
North Korea’s two main conditions are relatively clear. First is the withdrawal of the hostile policy toward North Korea, which includes military actions directed against North Korea, such as U.S.-ROK joint military exercises, as well as economic pressure such as sanctions. The second is respect for North Korea’s status as stipulated in its Constitution. This means abandoning demands for denuclearization and recognizing North Korea’s influence as a “strategic state.”
What would happen if Washington actually fulfilled these conditions?
Are We Already Seeing Signs?
The United States is surely well aware of what North Korea is demanding. It appears that this is why President Trump has now reduced U.S.-ROK joint military exercises.
Trump also acknowledged that North Korea possesses as many as 57 nuclear weapons. By simply stating the specific number of nuclear weapons, Trump already implies—if not subliminally—North Korea’s status as a nuclear-weapon state. In fact, when asked by reporters whether denuclearization of North Korea was still the goal, he avoided being explicit, saying, “I don’t want to talk about that”—in fact, avoiding the word “denuclearization” altogether. This is consistent with Trump’s past statements; he had previously said that the United States needs to get along with countries that possess nuclear weapons. His efforts to move closer to North Korea’s demands are becoming increasingly evident.
Meanwhile, The Wall Street Journal reported on August 18, citing U.S. officials, that President Trump was pressing his advisers to work toward arranging a U.S.-North Korea summit as early as this fall. Several media outlets have predicted that a summit could be pursued on the occasion of the APEC summit to be held in Shenzhen, China, in November. Since the U.S. midterm elections will also take place in November, President Trump may be eager to secure a summit before then.
South Korea’s NIS: a U.S.-North Korea summit “at any time”
The latest evidence comes from South Korea’s National Intelligence Service. On September 1, citing signs of dialogue, although no specific contacts have been confirmed, the NIS told the National Assembly that a U.S.-North Korea summit could take place “at any time.” The assessment follows President Trump’s renewed outreach to Kim Jong Un, including his reported move to reduce U.S.-South Korean joint military exercises. An even clearer sign that a summit could take place at any time is that the White House has reportedly begun behind-the-scenes preparations, including consulting the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency about possible cooperation with North Korea on recovering U.S. war remains—similar to preparations ahead of the 2018 Singapore summit.
Back to the WHAT-IF Scenarios
1. Dialogue Between Washington and Pyongyang Would Begin
Imagine just a few possibilities among many: diplomatic relations could be established, exchanges and travel could resume, Korean Americans could visit their loved ones in North Korea, and, at some distant future, the United States could also invest in North Korea. In that case, the two declarations discussed above—North Korea’s two main conditions, the withdrawal of U.S. hostility, including joint military exercises and economic sanctions, and respect for its status as a nuclear-armed “strategic state,” including abandoning demands for denuclearization—would effectively be implemented automatically.
Since the United States had suspended the joint military exercises, there would be nothing further for North Korea to demand on that issue.
And since the United States had already abandoned its demand for denuclearization, South Korea could no longer insist on it unilaterally and could withdraw its own demand as well.
2. What About Opposition in Washington?
Within the U.S., there would certainly be strong opposition from the mainstream political establishment, in Congress, and from both the Democratic and Republican parties. However, the Trump administration’s strong initiative and concomitant response from North Korea, especially if buttressed by China and Russia, would effectively mitigate the opposition. Ostensibly, a Republican president would be able to sell U.S.-North Korea rapprochement not only to the American public—although Trump’s unpopularity is a major obstacle at the moment—but also to the U.S. Congress, which is traditionally against permanent peace in Korea because of the military-industrial-complex interests in their districts and constituency interests in keeping U.S. military bases in South Korea.
3. What About the American Public?
Further, according to the polls, Americans have consistently supported U.S.-DPRK normalization. The main opposition is the Washington security establishment and interest groups that benefit from U.S. militaristic policy in Korea.
The main obstacle to normalization may not be the American people, but the Washington security establishment and the interests that benefit from a permanent state of militarization on the Korean Peninsula.
4. What Could South Korea Do?
What if, amid such an atmosphere, South Korea proposed reopening the Kaesong Industrial Complex, sending tourists to the Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone, and pursuing other inter-Korean engagement and development projects? These could include the South Korean Unification Ministry’s plans to restart construction of the Gyeongwon railway to North Korea next year, as part of a broader effort to promote peaceful coexistence and inter-Korean exchange. The ministry also expects North Korea to deepen ties with China and Russia and pursue arms-control rather than denuclearization talks with Washington, while remaining cautious toward Seoul.
Bottom Line
If the U.S. chose rapprochement, abandoned denuclearization, and abandoned its hostile policy toward North Korea, then inter-Korean relations could move forward even one step. It would be the clearest way to achieve normalization between the U.S. and North Korea. South Korea would just follow.
Don’t like it? But, sadly, that is the reality of the Republic of Korea.
Within South Korea, there would certainly be opposition from conservatives, and the People Power Party would oppose such measures. However, in view of the fact that South Korean conservatives dutifully follow Washington, it would be relatively easy to address their opposition. But what about the South Korean public? There would probably be considerable public support. During the height of the U.S.-North Korea summits in 2018, more than 80 percent of Koreans supported rapprochement, and a similar percentage had a positive view of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.
Another “What If?” Question
Now let us reverse the question.
What if the U.S. refuses to accept North Korea’s conditions?
What if Washington maintains its current hostile policy, continues joint military exercises, and pursues its Indo-Pacific policy, which is a threat to regional peace? The following are likely outcomes:
1. North Korea will continue to develop its nuclear weapons and missiles.
2. North Korea will strengthen its alliance with Russia and China.
3. North Korea will continue to strengthen its deterrence against the U.S.
Despite North Korea having no self-interest in attacking the U.S., when it is attacked, it will also keep augmenting its capability to target not only U.S. military bases in South Korea but also the U.S. mainland.
But Here Comes the Punch: Who Changes History?
The strongest force that can change history: people.
The establishment of diplomatic relations with North Korea, a U.S.-North Korea summit, and rapprochement alone would not necessarily mean that the United States would abandon future hostile actions toward North Korea—including efforts aimed at regime change—or other nations in Northeast Asia. For instance, after the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the establishment of the Soviet Union in 1922, the United States initially refused to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, but eventually established relations in 1933. Even then, however, the United States continued hostile actions toward the Soviet Union and pursued efforts aimed at undermining its system. Another example: the U.S. is currently launching a plethora of anti-China policies despite the two countries’ normalized status. There are numerous examples related to this.
Ultimately, this leads to the conclusion that forces advocating national autonomy and sovereignty must lead the Korean peace movement. These are the forces that must build their strength and prepare to lead and advance the foundation of sovereign peace nationally and globally. Only when such forces remain vigilant and work to cultivate a commitment to national sovereignty and autonomy in South Korean society, in conjunction with international solidarity with all who work for the Korean peace movement—especially in the U.S., citizen activists, Korea peace activists, Korean Americans, etc.—can the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia be guided toward national liberation and enduring peace.
Back to Joyce
Back to Joyce’s question about waking up from history—the “nightmare”—and the question of the ability to free oneself from such history. Raising the “What If?” question and imagining, while keeping our heads and feet firmly grounded in an accurate understanding of reality, could help us create another reality—free from the historical and present reality of a divided Korea under perpetual warmaking. Forces advocating national autonomy and sovereignty must lead the Korean peace movement.
코리아 업데이트
9월 1일, 2026년
한국 국정원 “북미 정상회담, 언제라도 가능”
WHAT IF 미국이 북한이 제시한 조건을 충족한다면?
북한이 제시한 두 가지 주요 조건은 비교적 명확하다. 첫째는 북한에 대한 적대시 정책의 철회이다. 여기에는 한미연합군사훈련과 같이 북한을 겨냥한 군사적 행동은 물론, 제재와 같은 경제적 압박도 포함된다. 둘째는 북한 헌법에 명시된 북한의 지위를 존중하는 것이다. 이는 비핵화 요구를 포기하고 북한의 영향력을 “전략국가”로 인정하는 것을 의미한다.
만약 워싱턴이 실제로 이 조건들을 충족한다면 어떤 일이 벌어질까?
이미 징후가 나타나고 있는가?
미국은 북한이 무엇을 요구하고 있는지 분명히 알고 있을 것이다. 트럼프 대통령이 최근 한미연합군사훈련을 축소한 것도 바로 이 때문인 것으로 보인다.
트럼프 대통령은 또한 북한이 최대 57개의 핵무기를 보유하고 있다고 인정했다. 트럼프가 북한의 핵무기 보유 규모를 구체적인 숫자로 언급한 것 자체가, 적어도 암묵적으로는 북한을 핵보유국으로 인정하는 것을 의미한다. 실제로 기자들이 북한 비핵화가 여전히 목표인지 묻자 그는 **“그 문제에 대해서는 이야기하고 싶지 않다”**고 답하며 명확한 입장을 밝히지 않았고, 사실상 ‘비핵화’라는 단어 자체를 피했다. 이는 트럼프의 과거 발언과도 일치한다. 그는 이전에도 미국이 핵무기를 보유한 국가들과 잘 지내야 한다고 말한 바 있다. 북한의 요구에 한 걸음씩 가까워지고 있는 트럼프의 움직임은 점점 더 분명해지고 있다.
한편 월스트리트저널은 8월 18일 미국 정부 관계자들을 인용해 트럼프 대통령이 이르면 올가을 북미 정상회담을 성사시키기 위해 참모들에게 준비를 압박하고 있다고 보도했다. 여러 언론은 11월 중국 선전에서 열리는 APEC 정상회의를 계기로 북미 정상회담이 추진될 가능성을 전망했다. 미국 중간선거 역시 11월에 예정되어 있기 때문에 트럼프 대통령이 그 전에 정상회담을 성사시키기를 원할 가능성도 있다.
한국 국정원: 북미 정상회담은 “언제라도 가능”
가장 최근의 징후는 한국 국가정보원에서 나왔다. 국정원은 9월 1일 국회에 구체적인 접촉이 확인된 것은 아니지만 대화 징후가 있다면서 북미 정상회담이 **“언제라도 가능하다”**고 보고했다. 이는 트럼프 대통령이 김정은 위원장에 대한 대화 재개 의지를 다시 적극적으로 표명하고 있는 가운데 나온 평가다. 특히 트럼프 대통령이 한미연합군사훈련 축소를 지시한 것으로 알려진 점도 이러한 움직임의 하나로 평가된다.
더욱 분명한 징후는 백악관이 정상회담 가능성에 대비해 물밑 준비를 시작했다는 것이다. 백악관은 미군 유해 발굴·송환을 담당하는 전쟁포로·실종자 확인국(DPAA)에 북미 정상 간 합의가 이뤄질 경우 어떤 조치를 취할 수 있는지를 문의한 것으로 알려졌다. 이는 2018년 싱가포르 정상회담을 앞두고 이루어진 준비와 유사하다.
WHAT IF 시나리오로 돌아가 보자
1. 워싱턴과 평양 사이에 대화가 시작된다
가능성 가운데 몇 가지만 상상해 보자. 북미 간 외교관계가 수립되고, 교류와 여행이 재개되며, 재미동포들이 북한에 있는 가족을 방문할 수 있게 되고, 먼 미래에는 미국이 북한에 투자하는 상황도 가능할 것이다.
그렇게 되면 앞서 언급한 북한의 두 가지 주요 조건—한미연합군사훈련과 경제제재를 포함한 미국의 대북 적대정책 철회, 그리고 비핵화 요구를 포기하고 북한을 핵무장한 “전략국가”로 인정하는 등 북한의 지위를 존중하는 것—은 사실상 자동으로 이행될 것이다.
미국이 이미 한미연합군사훈련을 중단했다면 북한이 이 문제에 대해 더 이상 요구할 것도 없을 것이다.
또한 미국이 이미 비핵화 요구를 포기했다면 한국도 이를 일방적으로 계속 주장하기 어려워지고, 한국 역시 비핵화 요구를 철회할 수밖에 없을 것이다.
2. 워싱턴의 반대는 어떻게 될까?
미국 내에서는 기성 정치권과 의회, 민주당과 공화당 양쪽에서 분명 강한 반대가 나올 것이다. 그러나 트럼프 행정부의 강력한 주도권과 이에 상응하는 북한의 반응, 특히 중국과 러시아가 이를 뒷받침한다면 이러한 반대는 상당 부분 완화될 수 있다. 공화당 대통령인 트럼프는 미국 국민에게—물론 현재 트럼프의 낮은 지지율은 주요 장애물이다—뿐만 아니라, 한국에서의 미군기지 유지와 군산복합체의 이해관계가 걸려 있는 지역구 및 유권자들의 이해관계 때문에 전통적으로 한반도의 영구적인 평화에 반대해 온 미국 의회에도 북미 관계 개선을 설득할 수 있을 것이다.
3. 미국 국민은 어떨까?
더욱이 여론조사를 보면 미국인들은 일관되게 북미 관계 정상화를 지지해 왔다. 주요 반대 세력은 미국 국민이라기보다 워싱턴의 안보 기득권과 한반도의 군사주의적 정책으로 이익을 얻는 이해집단이다.
북미 관계 정상화의 가장 큰 장애물은 미국 국민이 아니라 워싱턴의 안보 기득권과 한반도의 상시적인 군사화로 이익을 얻는 세력일 수 있다.
4. 한국은 무엇을 할 수 있을까?
그러한 분위기 속에서 한국이 개성공단 재개, 원산갈마해안관광지구 관광 재개, 그리고 그 밖의 남북 교류·개발 사업을 제안한다면 어떨까?
여기에는 평화적 공존과 남북 교류를 위한 보다 광범위한 노력의 일환으로, 한국 통일부가 내년에 북한으로 연결되는 경원선 철도 건설을 재개하려는 계획도 포함될 수 있다. 통일부는 또한 북한이 중국과 러시아와의 관계를 더욱 강화하고, 워싱턴과의 협상에서는 비핵화가 아닌 군비통제를 추구할 것으로 전망하면서도, 서울에 대해서는 신중한 태도를 유지할 것으로 보고 있다.
Bottom Line
미국이 북핵 비핵화 요구를 포기하고 대북 적대정책을 철회하면서 관계 개선을 선택한다면, 남북관계는 비로소 한 걸음이라도 앞으로 나아갈 수 있을 것이다. 이것이야말로 미국과 북한의 관계 정상화를 이루는 가장 분명한 방법일 것이다. 한국은 그저 따라갈 것이다.
결국 이러한 상황은 한반도의 평화와 번영, 통일을 위해 민족의 자주와 주권을 주장하는 세력이 한국의 평화운동을 이끌어야 한다는 결론으로 이어진다. 이러한 세력이 힘을 키우고, 국내외적으로 주권과 평화의 기반을 구축하고 이를 발전시켜 나갈 준비를 해야 한다. 그러한 세력이 경계를 늦추지 않고 한국 사회에서 민족의 주권과 자주에 대한 의지를 키우는 동시에, 특히 미국의 시민활동가, 한반도 평화활동가, 재미동포 등 한국의 평화운동을 위해 노력하는 모든 이들과 국제적 연대를 강화할 때, 비로소 한반도와 동북아시아를 민족해방과 지속 가능한 평화의 방향으로 이끌 수 있을 것이다.
“What If?”라는 질문을 던지는 것
그리고 현실에 대한 정확한 이해를 바탕으로, 우리의 머리와 발을 현실에 굳건히 딛고 “What If?”라는 질문을 던지고 상상하는 것은 우리가 또 다른 현실을 만들어내는 데 도움이 될 수 있다. 분단된 한국, 그리고 끊임없는 전쟁 위협과 군사주의 속에 놓인 역사적·현재적 현실로부터 벗어난 또 다른 현실을 말이다.
민족의 자주와 주권을 주장하는 세력이 한국의 평화운동을 이끌어야 한다.
—시몬 천
Selected References
Yonhap News Agency. “Trump Moves to Scale Back U.S.-South Korea Military Exercises.” August 19, 2026.
Original URL: https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260819005400315“White House Appears to Be Preparing for U.S.–North Korea Talks, Inquires with War Remains Agency: ‘Similar to 2018.’” Chosun Ilbo, September 1, 2026.
Original URL: https://www.chosun.com/international/us/2026/09/01/ACSJSXYJ25GR7OKYZ72IM4JTXQ/“NIS: U.S.–North Korea Summit Could Happen at Any Time — Signs of Behind-the-Scenes White House Preparations.” Hankyoreh, September 1, 2026.
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Original URL: https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260819005400315PBS. “The New York Philharmonic: Live from North Korea — Introduction.” Great Performances.
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Original URL: https://www.commondreams.org/opinion/us-call-for-peace-koreaAction Network. “Urge Your Member of Congress to Restart U.S.-DPRK Dialogues.”
Original URL: https://actionnetwork.org/letters/urge-your-member-of-congress-to-restart-us-dprk-dialogues/Mirkin, Kenneth. “New York Philharmonic Goes to Pyongyang.” Senza Sordino, March 2008.
Original URL: https://www.icsom.org/senzasordino/2008/03/new-york-philharmonic-goes-to-pyongyang/Google Forms. “U.S.-DPRK Dialogue and Peace Initiative.”
Original URL: https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdK2dV_jcITRv8EygMO5bOmwZYB8Apb_6D3ZsE2dKlRgURiRw/viewformNew York Philharmonic. “The New York Philharmonic in North Korea.” Video.
Original URL:“The question remains whether the concert was a “success.” If success is measured in immediate de-nuclearization or regime change (theirs, not ours), the concert is unlikely to be hailed as successful. But those of us who were in Pyongyang know that, at least for a brief moment, we pried open even the hardest of hearts and touched a group of people in a way that no politician or soldier can dream of. In the process, many of us returned forever changed, reminded that music and the arts, along with the freedom to express them, are perhaps the greatest gifts we possess.
Kenneth Mirkin joined the New York Philharmonic as a violist in 1982. He has served on that orchestra’s negotiating, orchestra, tour, and pension committees for as long as he can remember. He currently serves as the Philharmonic’s ICSOM delegate.”
I truly appreciate your support and solidarity—it means a great deal to me. As always, your comments, thoughts, and feedback are most welcome. —Simone Chun
