"No Fig Leaf, No Pretense": Biden Appointee Gen. Brunson, the East-Up Map, and America’s Unapologetic Aggression 바이든이 임명한 브런슨 주한미군 사령관의 끊임없는 호전성을 규탄한다. 미국에서 다시 새겨 보는 김정호의 대동여지도 정신.
The Korea–Japan–Philippines (KJP) axis as a key component of the U.S.’s escalating military posture in the region that makes South Korea a prime military target.
Review: [Commander’s article] The East-Up Map: Revealing Hidden Strategic Advantages in the Indo-Pacific
By Gen. Xavier T. Brunson, Commander of United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea
There was a famous Korean cartographer who literally walked the entire Korean Peninsula to create the first modern Korean map — Kim Jeong-ho’s Daedongyeojido.
Imagine the horror he would feel seeing the nation turned upside down by the U.S. commander.
Claiming that a simple change in map perspective can transform strategic understanding and the battlespace, Brunson argues for the strategic value of reorienting maps — rotating the traditional north‑up view so that east is at the top — to gain new insights into regional security in the Indo-Pacific.
Brunson claimed that the Korean Peninsula’s strategic location places it at the intersection of several regional axes, allowing it to challenge or constrain military actions by Russia’s Northern Fleet, China’s Northern Theater Command, and North Korea. He argued that this new perspective should shape how the ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command plans operations, conducts exercises, and manages logistics. Brunson emphasized that treating the peninsula as a pivotal area requires tighter coordination between the two militaries and planning that assumes fully integrated joint operations across all domains. In short, it’s focused entirely on projecting power and imposing costs on potential adversaries.
What is even more pathetic is that Koreans have nothing to say about this vile person and act. How humiliating it is to see Korea’s map distorted like that. You only do that when you see a nation as a mere means to satisfy your own greed. Koreans — President Lee, politicians, the media — have nothing to say about it. Further, the former president Moon and the first lady were having a great time with the man who humiliated Korea.
Here is what geopolitical experts comment on Brunson’s map:
K.J. Noh
”The two things that stood out for me about Brunson’s new map were:
No pretense that this is about peace, deterrence, or stability/security. This is all about planning and visualization for aggressive war against China/Russia, without even the usual fig-leaf boilerplate of “deterring aggression,” “containing China/maintaining stability,” or even “rescuing/defending Taiwan.” It’s about military coordination for “cost imposition,” “achieving effects” (i.e., aggression).
They acknowledge that China is playing defense and the U.S. is offense (”USFK/Korea is already inside the Chinese defensive perimeter”) and the U.S. is “imposing costs/effects” (i.e., attacking). Notice how absurd the terms in 1) are when you have already staked out a position within an opponent’s defensive perimeter.
(Remember, anytime you see the word “operations,” it’s the military euphemism for WAR.)
When the same region is viewed with east orientation toward the top, the strategic picture transforms dramatically. The first island chain, a cornerstone of Indo-Pacific strategy, takes on new meaning. Forces already positioned on the Korean Peninsula are revealed not as distant assets requiring reinforcement, but as troops already positioned inside the bubble perimeter that the U.S. would need to penetrate in the event of crisis or contingency.
This shift in perspective illuminates Korea’s role as a natural strategic pivot. Distance analysis reveals Camp Humphreys’ proximity to potential threats: approximately 158 miles from Pyongyang, 612 miles from Beijing, and approximately 500 miles from Vladivostok. Korea is positioned to address northern threats from Russia while simultaneously providing western reach against Chinese activities in the waters between Korea and China. More specifically, this perspective highlights the peninsula’s capacity to impose costs on Russia, not allowing their fleet to enter the waters east of Korea, effectively making that a more defensible maritime area and limiting adversary naval movements. Similarly, in the waters off the west coast of Korea, the east-up orientation clarifies how forces on the peninsula can impose costs not only on the CCP’s Northern Theater Army but also on the Northern Fleet, thus demonstrating the significant strategic potential that exists on the peninsula to influence adversary operations in both adjacent seas.
The strategic value becomes even clearer when viewed from what I call the “Beijing perspective,” imagining the strategic landscape as it appears to Chinese planners. From Beijing, American forces at installations like Osan Air Base appear not as distant threats requiring complex power projection, but as immediately proximate capabilities positioned to achieve effects in or around China. This proximity represents a significant strategic advantage that traditional north-up mapping tends to obscure.
Perhaps the most significant insight from east-up mapping is the emergence of a strategic triangle connecting Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. When these three mutual defense treaty partners are viewed as vertices of a triangle rather than isolated bilateral relationships, their collective potential becomes clear.
This triangular framework offers complementary capabilities across each vertex. Korea provides strategic depth and central positioning within the regional architecture, with the added advantage of cost-imposition capabilities against both Russian and Chinese forces. Japan contributes advanced technological capabilities and controls critical maritime chokepoints along the Pacific shipping lanes. The Philippines offers southern access points and control over vital sea lanes connecting the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
Together, these three allies can create an integrated network enabling situational awareness and coordinated responses across all domains. The geometric clarity of this relationship, visible primarily through east-up mapping, suggests opportunities for enhanced trilateral cooperation that may not be immediately apparent from traditional perspectives.
Military planners frequently refer to the “tyranny of distance” as a constraint on Indo-Pacific operations. While distance remains a critical factor, east-up mapping reveals that current positioning may offer advantages that traditional perspectives obscure. The scale of the Pacific creates operational challenges, but it also creates opportunities for those already positioned within the theater.
The command perspective reinforces this point: rather than focusing solely on the challenges of power projection across the vast distances of the Pacific, planners should recognize that strategic positioning already achieved can transform distance from obstacle to advantage. When forces are properly positioned within the theater, they can impose costs on adversaries while maintaining defensive advantages.
Understanding these geographic relationships through multiple perspectives enables more accurate operational planning and resource allocation. Distance remains a constraint, but proper positioning can transform it from an insurmountable obstacle into a manageable challenge.
These insights carry practical implications for contemporary force planning. First, existing force positioning, particularly on the Korean Peninsula, may offer greater strategic advantages than currently recognized. Rather than viewing these deployments as vulnerable forward positions requiring reinforcement, planners might consider them as advantageously positioned assets already inside the defensive perimeter, capable of immediate cost-imposition against multiple adversaries.
Second, the strategic triangle framework suggests possibilities for enhanced burden-sharing and coordinated capability development among alliance partners. Rather than maintaining separate bilateral relationships, the United States might benefit from fostering trilateral cooperation that leverages each partner’s geographic advantages and complementary capabilities.
Operational planners should experiment with east-up mapping when conducting Indo-Pacific analysis, particularly when examining alliance coordination opportunities and assessing existing force positioning advantages. The geometric clarity of the Korea-Japan-Philippines triangle becomes most apparent through this alternative perspective, while the cost-imposition capabilities visible from Korean positioning provide concrete operational advantages.
Geography remains the foundation of strategy, but our understanding of geography depends heavily on how we choose to view it. The east-up mapping approach reveals strategic relationships and advantages in the Indo-Pacific that remain obscured by traditional north-up orientations. Most significantly, it illuminates the potential of the Korea-Japan-Philippines strategic triangle as a framework for enhanced alliance cooperation, while demonstrating the immediate cost-imposition capabilities that existing force positioning already provides.
Sometimes the most profound strategic revelations come from the simplest change in how we look at the world. The east-up map is one such change, transforming distant challenges into proximate advantages and revealing the hidden geometry of alliance cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.”
Tim Beal
“Imperial militaries are similar to the ship’s captain with a trip‑fig-leaf pretext in every port. Each colony is told that it is special and central. No doubt the commander of USFJ tells the Japanese how Japan is the hub of the U.S. military shield ‘protecting’ the region from China. However, Brunson is downgrading the traditional ‘trip‑fig-leaf pretext’ and unashamedly positioning Korea as a hub (if not quite the hub) of the U.S. forward military presence in the region aimed at China and Russia. One consequence of that, seemingly not realized by the KT journalist, is that if USFK can ‘impose costs on military activity by Russia’s Northern Fleet, China’s Northern Theater Command, and North Korea,’ then South Korea becomes a primary target for those three rather formidable military powers. But that is the fate of pawns, as Ukraine is finding out…. It’s an unwelcome prospect for Korea but too dangerous to ignore.”
“It’s all about aggression.”
Takeaways:
The Korea–Japan–Philippines (KJP) axis is emerging as a key component of the U.S.’s escalating military posture in the region, highlighting the strategic value of this triangular alliance for coordinated operations and the immediate power to impose costs based on current force deployments.
This positioning makes South Korea a prime target for the military capabilities of Russia, China, and North Korea.
At its core, the strategy is unapologetically aggressive.
Back to Kim Jeong-ho’s Daedongyeojido:
“In this map, Kim Jeong-ho described the Korean natural environment in great detail, emphasizing mountain ranges as the frame of the country. All of the nation’s mountains are shown to form a connected network linking to Mt. Baekdu. The mountains are elaborately rendered according to their size and significance, while the waterways flowing between the mountains are depicted differently depending on their flow and volume. In addition to natural features, the map also vividly represents many human settlements and constructions, such as towns and transportation routes. With a wealth of information related to administration, transportation, the military, and the economy, Daedongnyeojido provided viewers with a rich and varied knowledge of Korean geography…. As such, these woodblocks of Daedongnyeojido embody not only the territorial representation of Korea in the late Joseon period, but also the blood, sweat, and tears of the master cartographer Kim Jeong-ho, who dedicated his life to recording and distributing accurate geographical information.”
Will barbarians understand the “blood, sweat, and tears” of the master and the Korean nation and land?
Gabriel García Márquez once reflected that when he returned to his childhood home, he realized that everything that had happened in his early years held a literary value. From that moment, he decided to become a writer, believing that no one could stop him, and that his only task was to become “the best writer in the world.”
Like the greatest writers, for many, Korea is not a merely U.S. military outpost; it is a land where people grow up, where countless experiences carry uplifting and inspiring value, and where dreams are born—to create, to imagine, and to become the fullest human creator one can be.







This is horribly alarming and yet, unsurprising at this point.