"Is the United States Ready to Relinquish OPCON?" 조건부 전시작전통제권(OPCON) 전환 체제는 대한민국의 주권을 제한하며 사실상 속국 상태를 고착화한다.
“Korea is more than ready to regain OPCON. Is the United States ready to relinquish it?”
A recent article in Hankyoreh raised that question. My answer is no—if not never. Here are the reasons why.
The transfer of OPCON has been under discussion for roughly two decades. After numerous delays, political disputes, and shifting timelines, the South Korean government has spent years preparing for a possible transition, hoping it could finally occur in the near future.
Until now, this process has largely been treated as a matter to be negotiated between Seoul and Washington. The new congressional language introduces additional roadblocks and conditions that make the transfer of OPCON almost impossible.
Context
The Lee Jae Myung administration hopes to regain OPCON as early as late next year. According to the latest Hankyoreh:
“The ground forces would consist of 99% South Korean troops. South Korea would also account for 95% of naval forces and 90% of air forces. The framework is one in which the South Korean armed forces would assume the majority of responsibility in the event of a kinetic conflict on the Korean Peninsula.
According to figures from Statistics Korea (now the Ministry of Data and Statistics) and other sources, North Korea’s annual nominal gross domestic product (GDP) amounted to around 43.7 trillion won in 2024, while South Korea’s national defense budget for the same year was 59.4 trillion won. In other words, South Korea’s defense spending was larger than the entire North Korean economy.
While meeting with members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on May 31, Ahn Gyu-back stated that he ‘fully explained South Korea’s capabilities, including the agreement between South Korea and the United States in 2020 that 94% of the conditions for the OPCON transfer had already been met.’”
Is the United States Ready to Relinquish OPCON?
The U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee’s version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) requires that, before any transfer of wartime operational control or reduction of U.S. forces in Korea can proceed, the Secretary of Defense must certify to Congress that such actions are “in the national security interest of the United States.”
In the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2027, this requirement has been strengthened further.
The legislation states:
“The Secretary of Defense shall certify to Congress, not later than 60 days before the transfer of wartime operational control, that such transfer is in the national security interest of the United States.”
It further requires that:
“The certification shall include the results of independent military risk assessments conducted by the Commander of United States Forces Korea, the Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”
In addition:
“The Secretary of Defense shall certify that appropriate consultations have been conducted with all allies participating in the United Nations Command, including the Republic of Korea, Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada, and others.”
1. The “Condition-based” Transfer of OPCON Makes the ROK a Vassal State
From Washington’s perspective, whether South Korea is fully sovereign may be beside the point. What matters are the strategic assets and institutions referenced throughout the NDAA language: the Combined Forces Command, United States Forces Korea, the United Nations Command, and the broader regional security architecture that underpins American power projection in the Indo-Pacific.
From that perspective, military sovereignty is not simply a constitutional issue; it is a strategic one. A fully autonomous South Korean military might make decisions that diverge from U.S. priorities regarding China, Japan, or regional contingencies.
2. OPCON Becomes Contingent on American Institutions and Allied Stakeholders
The most controversial aspect concerns third-party involvement.
The Senate NDAA requires the Secretary of Defense to certify to Congress, at least 60 days before any wartime OPCON transfer, that the transfer serves U.S. national security interests and has been preceded by consultations with U.S. allies, including South Korea, Japan, and all countries that have contributed military forces to the United Nations Command.
Under the proposed framework, consultations and assessments involving the U.S. Congress, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Indo-Pacific Command, United States Forces Korea, the United Nations Command, and UNC-participating states become integral components of the process.
Formally, the legal obligation falls on the U.S. Secretary of Defense. Yet the practical effect is that South Korea’s wartime command authority becomes contingent upon a broader network of American institutions and allied stakeholders.
South Korea’s wartime command authority becomes contingent upon a broader network of American institutions and allied stakeholders.
Suppose Japan were strongly opposed to the OPCON transfer. The legislation does not appear to grant Tokyo a formal veto. Yet if consultations reveal significant opposition and the Secretary of Defense declines to certify the transfer, congressional resistance could follow, funding could be withheld, and the transition could fail.
The possibility may be indirect, but it is real.
3. Has there ever been a case in which a sovereign state seeking to regain command authority over its own military was required to consult third countries as a precondition?
This raises a broader historical question.
Did West Germany need British or French approval to exercise operational control over its forces? Did France require British consent when withdrawing from NATO’s integrated military command? Did Japan seek South Korean approval when restructuring the command arrangements of the Self-Defense Forces? Does the United States require Mexico’s approval to exercise operational control over its own forces?
Yet South Korea now finds itself in a situation where consultations with countries such as Japan, the United Kingdom, and Canada are formally incorporated into the process governing the restoration of wartime command authority over its own armed forces.
Whatever one’s position on the alliance, this arrangement is unprecedented and represents the ultimate insult to Korea.
4. Can a country be considered a fully “normal” sovereign state when the restoration of command over its own military depends not on its own constitutional institutions, but on certification by a foreign legislature?
According to South Korea’s Constitution, the armed forces belong to the Republic of Korea, and supreme command authority rests with the president.
“According to South Korea’s Constitution, supreme command authority rests with the president. Yet the logic embedded in current U.S. congressional debates places American national interests first.”
Can a country be considered a fully “normal” sovereign state when the restoration of command over its own military depends not on its own constitutional institutions, but on certification by a foreign legislature?
Yet the logic embedded in current U.S. congressional debates places American national interests first. If OPCON transfer ultimately depends on certification by the U.S. Congress and the executive branch, then South Korea’s wartime command authority remains conditional upon American approval.
5. “Is the United States ready to relinquish it?” is the wrong question. The more fundamental question is:
Is the United States ready to abandon its imperial quest in East Asia?
As long as the current capitalist–military-industrial complex remains dominant, the answer is no.